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Inequality Patterns and Quality Erosion in Tertiary Education: Is There a Way out?
(Case of Russia)
The paper explores developments in the sphere of tertiary education in Russia during the period
of socio-economic transformation. It is demonstrated that under market reforms deceptively
positive tendency to educational expansion conceals rising inequality in access to education,
quality erosion and increasing human capital mismatch thus reducing competitive advantage of
Russia lying with national human resources. Alternative approaches to educational reform more
favourable for sustainable development are discussed.
1. Introduction
In the world of today the skills and motivation of people play the chief role in strengthening the
position of any country in the global economy. The quality of human and social capital of a
nation is crucial for a country's economic performance. And the key sphere responsible for
accumulation and quality of those intangible assets is the sphere of education.
Russia to this day has a well-developed educational system and the level of education and skills
of its population ranks high in international comparisons. According to UNDP data, only 24
countries of the world surpass Russia by education index. As far as this index is concerned
Russia is on a par with countries belonging to the high human development group. But the recent
trends observed in the sphere of education are controversial demonstrating its rapid expansion on
the one hand, and segmentation of educational system with deterioration of quality in mass
education on the other.
In this paper the controversial developments of educational system in Russia during the period of
reforms  are  explored.  In  the  section  2  the  merits  and  shortcomings  of  the  Soviet  system  of
education (forming the starting point of the reforms) are evaluated. In the section 3 the adopted
concept of educational reform and its first outcomes leading to quality erosion are discussed.
Section 4 highlights educational preferences, strategies and options opened for different
categories of families. Section 5 explores the labour market angle of educational quality erosion
and human capital mismatch. Lastly in section 6 alternative approaches to reform including
income contingent tuition scheme are discussed.
Retrospective
The achievements of Russia in the sphere of education date back into the Soviet period. In the
former Soviet Union first fighting illiteracy and later providing vast educational opportunities
was a first rate priority. During 20 prewar years (1921-1940) about 60 million illiterate citizens
were taught to read and write. The Census of 1959 demonstrated that there were practically no
illiterate in the country. Expanding access to education contributed to communicative
competence of vast population groups vital for sustainable development, strengthened equality of
opportunity irrespective of financial circumstances, and was favourable for establishing cohesion
in society and creation of social capital.
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Up to the 1970s public expenditure on education as a percent of GDP was growing steadily
reaching its maximum of 7% in 1971. At that time it was twice as much as the corresponding
share in the GDP of the USA. As a result in a relatively short period of time Russia succeeded in
substantially upgrading the educational and professional qualifications of its population.
According to the Census of 1989 the share of adult population with university education
amounted to 13% while the share of adults with insufficient educational attainment (less than 8
years) was about 37%. For comparison the corresponding figures for East European countries at
the start of market reforms were 5.3% versus 54.6% for Poland, 5.8% versus 66.9% for Hungary,
5.7% versus 75.7% for Bulgaria and 3.5% versus 57.3% for Czechoslovakia.
The system also contained mechanisms to link professional education with future employment. It
is worth noting that the mere fact of sustaining full employment and providing a regular job for
everybody in most cases fairly well matching his or her professional qualifications prevented the
process of skill and work culture degradation and acted against social exclusion1.
At the same time the structure and contents of education were naturally tuned to the demands of
heavily militarized centrally planned economy. It explained the ‘technocratic bias’ of
professional education: a large share of students was concentrated in science and technology
while training in humanities and social sciences was provided on a relatively modest scale. Also
in a non-market economy practicing centralized allocation of resources there was little need for
professionals  in  sales,  marketing,  etc.   In  the  second half  of  XX century  all  sorts  of  engineers
accounted for about 1/3 of total employment. At early 1970s the share of engineering students
amounted to almost 50% of the university enrollment while in the USA it constituted only 7%.
Table 1
Satiation of economy with engineers in the USSR and the USA
Number of engineers (thousands) 1950 1960 1970
USSR 400 1135 2486
USA 310 590 905
Graduation of engineers (thousands)
USSR 37.4 120.4 257.4
USA 61 43 50
Source: , . .: , 1971. . 216,
239.
In the era of industrial mass-production the specifics of Soviet-type economy brought visible
economic advantages. The system was good at mobilizing resources (including the resources of
human capital) and sustaining discipline. Skilled labour was underpaid which meant little or no
monetary returns to human capital investment (Gregory and Kohlhase, 1988). Nevertheless
acquiring tertiary education gave important intangible rewards like status, interesting not routine
work, flexible working hours, and better working conditions. Taking into account that money
mattered a lot less in a soviet-type economy than in a market economy, going in for higher
education was in many cases a rational enough choice.
As a result a rather artificial situation was created and maintained for a long period of time. High
prestige of professional occupations made young people to opt for higher education, the quality
standards sustained in the educational system ensured very decent educational outcomes and the
1 The fact was noted in sovietological research of the time. See for example Ellman, 1979: 493.
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‘iron curtain’ made an outflow of skilled manpower from the national economy virtually
impossible.
The radical transformation of the 1990s put an end to this artificial situation. The new challenge
of meeting the competition in the global post-industrial economy where along with knowledge
and skills such qualities as creativity, initiative, willingness to take responsibility and risk
become the key factors of success called for reforms in the system of education.
Unfortunately pressing issues of modernizing the conceptual framework and technologies in the
sphere of education did not get much attention when educational reform was set in motion. The
focus of reform was on developing new economic mechanisms of supplying education that was
wrongly perceived as a market good.
The Concept of Educational Reform and First Outcomes
Reforms in  the  system of  education  started  along  with  the  overall  economic  reforms and  were
based on the same logic of market economy restoration. The architects of reform argued that
reliance on market forces in this sphere will eventually lead to better performance and produce
gains in efficiency and quality. The obvious theoretical basis underlying this strategy was of
course the human capital theory. Students were regarded as investors and colleges and
universities as commercial bodies providing marketable educational services.
So the key idea picked up from the human capital theory has been that education is a valuable
asset worth investing into. Meanwhile the specifics of human capital accumulation and the fact
that education is a mixed good (market and social at one time) were largely ignored. But both
these aspects are worth considering.
First, the process of human capital accumulation is interactive. It entails not only financial
investment but also ‘investment’ of effort, time and will (Schultz, 1976: 82-83). It follows that
with human capital accumulation outcome is much less predictable than with ordinary types of
investment. Two graduates from one and the same university may in fact and usually do end up
with a very different amount of accumulated human capital depending on their individual
aptitudes, motivation and effort (Breslav et al., 2003: 50; Le et al., 2005: 5). So even from a
strictly economic point of view it is rational to ensure that access to tertiary education (so long as
it is not universally accessible) were conditioned upon aptitudes and academic results of
applicants and not upon their financial circumstances.
Second, investment in education is a long-term enterprise associated with considerable risks.
Even within the bounds of mainstream paradigm it has been cogently demonstrated that risks are
higher and relative gains lower for children from poor families than for children from affluent
families (Cuevas, 2001). Key types of risks stem from fluctuations in the labour market demand
and (which is very important in the case of Russia) inability to spot in advance flaws in the
quality of education supplied by various institutions. As Kuzminov (2002) puts it, education has
a postponed verification effect. It’s hard if not impossible for the consumer of ‘educational
services’ to evaluate quality of what he is about to buy at the moment of decision-making.
Third, education is a social good and its costs and benefits cannot be comprehensively analyzed
in the framework of individualistic market relations. On the one hand, the decisions to go in for
more education, motivations for academic success can only partially be explained in terms of
incentives like increase in pay or promotion and penalties like pay cuts or unemployment.
Motivations  and  commitments  (and  hence  outcomes  of  the  educational  process)  have  a  strong
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social and cultural dimension, are influenced with values and norms shared in a social group or
in the society as a whole (Streeck, 1989; Coleman, 1988; Brown and Lauder, 2000).
On the other hand, the sphere of education is largely responsible not only for human capital
formation but also for the quality of national social capital. It is to a large extent in this sphere
values and norms prevailing in the society are transmitted and get embedded in the younger
generations to be carried along through the future life. Furthermore in this sphere both weak and
strong social ties are formed and communicative competence is developed. The crucial role of
getting access to information and ability to digest and disseminate it for sustainable growth based
on innovation makes equitable access to education a vital factor of national competitiveness
(Szreter, 2000: 65-68).
Therefore both economic and social considerations provide cogent arguments for strong state
involvement in supporting and shaping the system of education in order to ensure quality
standards, contribute to equitable access2 and minimize the inconsistency between the skills of
graduates and the labour market demand.
Nevertheless according to the logic of reforms in Russia the role of the state in shaping and
supporting educational system was bound to diminish gradually. As the present minister of
education and science Andrey Fursenko puts it, “strategically we need to create such an
educational system where universities are financially self-sufficient and not dependent on
resources allocated to them from the state budget”(Spori strategov…, 2004) .
The practical implementation of reform started with reduction of state educational budget.
During the 1990-s the GDP share of educational expenditure fell to 3.1%. Taking into account
the crisis GDP decline the overall reduction in educational expenditure was very substantial: in
real terms it reduced to about a half of the pre-reform amount. A modest growth in educational
expenditure was observed only in the mid 2000-s when it was verbally declared as one of four
national priority projects but the country still lags behind in per student educational expenditure,
especially as regards tertiary education (Table 2).
2 By equitable I mean conditioned upon aptitudes and academic results. Since aptitudes and abilities are unequally
distributed among people and more able individuals and those having acquired more cultural capital from their
families in preschool years tend to benefit more from education, educational expansion may in fact increase






















USA 10390 133.1 117538 134.0 24370 211.7
New Zealand 6278 80.4 72102 82.2 10262 89.1
United Kingdom 7167 91.8 84750 96.6 13506 117.3
Germany 7636 97.8 88100 100.4 12446 108.1
France 8927 114.4 89280 101.8 10995 95.5
Korea 6645 85.1 68424 78.0 7606 66.1
OECD 7804 100 87720 100 11512 100.0
Brasil 1186 15.2 13834 15.8 9994 86.8
Russia 1754 22.5 19296 22.0 3421 29.7
Calculated upon: Education at a Glance. OECD, 2008, pp. 218, 221.
The reduction in state expenditure has been poorly compensated by growing alternative sources
of investment. In contrast to the developed countries of the West where corporations play a
prominent role in financing educational programs the majority of Russian firms invest little in
education and training. The share of business in overall educational expenditure amounts to less
then 0.1% of GDP. Private household investment appears to be of more importance since it
accounts for another 1.9% of GDP. The trouble is that a substantial share of household
expenditure constitutes so called grey or black investment that is investment not exactly in
education itself but in getting access to it (Table 3).
Table 3













Grey Fees paid unofficially for private
coaching (mainly preparation for
entrance exams and for getting
support at exams)
28,3 3,9 0,7




*costs of education are covered from the state budget
** costs of education are covered by tuition fees paid by students
Source: Data of Educational Monitoring conducted by State University – Higher  School of
Economics for the Federal Agency for Education
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During the period of socio-economic transformation not only the state financial involvement in
the sphere of education was cut down but its control over the activities of the higher education
institutions loosened. As a result, after the shock decline in the demand for tertiary education in
the early 1990s, the steady cut down of government educational spending was accompanied by
rapid growth of the number of all sorts of universities and of enrolment rates (tables 4 and 5).
Table 4









1990 4328 2603 514
1993 4273 2607 524
1995 4166 2634 762
2000 3893 2703 965
2001 3872 2684 1008
2002 3843 2816 1039
2003 3798 2809 1044
2004 3686 2805 1071
2005 3392 2905 1068
2006 3207 2847 1090
Data of the Federal Agency for Education
Table 5
University education enrolment
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2824.5 2790.7 2964.9 3248.3 3597.9 4073.0 4741.4 5426.9 5947.5 6455.7 6884.2 7064.6 7309.8
Data of the Federal Agency for Education
During the last 15 years the number of public institutions providing university education
increased from 514 in 1990 to 660 in 2006. At the same time the number of non-public (private)
universities went up from zero to 430. The enrolment in tertiary education increased 2.5 times.
The number of tertiary students (including postgraduates) per 10000 people in 2006 amounted to
702 which is higher than in any of the OECD countries.  As regards university and postgraduate
(ISCED 5A/6) enrollment, only Finland ranks higher by this indicator.
So the declining resources allocated to the sphere of education are being spread among a
growing number of institutions and students. It is no wonder that the budget expenditure per
student is insufficient and lacks far behind the level necessary to ensure decent quality standards.
It is common knowledge that good education is expensive. With the meagre resources in their
possession many colleges and universities, especially the newborn and lacking academic
tradition, are unable to carry out their educative mission. They feel short of both – tangible assets
(well-equipped university building, library, computers and internet access, etc.) and human
resources (skilled and motivated body of teachers).
According to expert opinion to ensure the inflow of skilled personnel the wages in education are
to be at least 1.5 of the economy average with a higher school teacher earning 1.2 of economy
average wage and a university professor earning twice as much (Martsinkevich, 2005: 37). The
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estimate of the ‘ideal wage’ which will permit a university rector to hire ‘a teacher of his dream’
given by several rectors of Russian Universities was 50,000 rubles ($2,000 per month) for
Moscow and 35,000 rubles ($1,400 per month) for other Russian cities. At the same time the
actual average wage for Moscow university teachers in 2004 was 7,500 rubles (adult subsistence
minimum being 4,265 rubles), in other regions – 5,000 rubles3. The consequences are well
predictable:
-  outflow  of  most  efficient  and  competitive  cadres  from  the  profession  and  lack  of  inflow  of
young teachers (only about 40% of graduates from pedagogical faculties intended to follow their
occupation as compared to 91% of economists and 86% of lawyers; only 16% of university
teachers are below 30 while 21.3% are above 60 and 44.3% - above 50);
- widespread moonlighting and second-job-holding (over 70% of regular university teachers
have a second job, usually teaching in another university or as a private tutor or both):
- strong incentives for engaging in shadow schemes and corrupt practices (according to two
different surveys only 7% of students stated that they never confronted with corruption, less than
1/3 of respondents characterized corruptive behavior as unacceptable for them).
Table 6
Dynamics of relative wage in education (  %)
Wage in education as a percent to
1985 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
average wage in economy
78 67 61 65 63 56 67 62 65 61
average wage in manufacturing and mining
71 65 62 66 55 45 57 54 68* 66*
* as a percent to average wage in manufacturing
Source: Rosstat data
According to the expert opinion of the Working group for joining the Bologna process of more
than a thousand universities and academies currently operating in Russia only about a hundred
meet the requirements of European quality standards. This is one of the main reasons of strong
opposition to Bologna conventions manifested by the majority of Russian university rectors
(Verbitskaya, 2006). The same reason stays for the fact that Russia fails to join the international
tests for university students4.  Thus  we do  not  have  internationally  approved  system of  tertiary
education quality assessment. Still according to the Education monitoring more than a half of
employers state that the graduates of early 2000s have a worse educational and skills background
as compared with the graduates of early 1990s.
Some feeble attempts to impose quality control to the sphere of tertiary education were met with
strong opposition from those arguing for free market approach. They have two main arguments
3 Data  of  Educational  Monitoring  conducted  by  State  University  –  Higher  School  of  Economics  for  the  Federal
Agency for Education
4 According to the latest results of international comparative tests conducted among secondary school students of 40
countries, Russia ranked nearly at the bottom of the list being 33rd in reading comprehension and 30th in math.
Meanwhile in the middle of the 1990s Russia still had a respectable ranking in the upper-third of the list and at the
beginning of the decade when the reforms were to start, was at the top of it.
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against state interference. First, the closure of universities and faculties which fail to pass quality
tests will mean cutting off educational opportunities for many young people who are ‘not
geniuses but still have some aspirations’. Second, with the reduction of number of universities
the competition between the rest of them will be less tense and this will lead to another whirl of
quality deterioration. “Who will benefit from lack of competition in the market of educational
services? And does it really fall in line with the demand for education in Russian society? It’s the
consumer, the one who applies for educational services who should evaluate the quality of
education and of diploma he gets”(Sidorenko, 2004).
But do consumers (students and their families) possess necessary skills for quality control? The
results of sociological surveys clearly demonstrate that most of them possess little information
on existing educational opportunities, advantages and disadvantages of different establishments
and even less knowledge and skills to evaluate quality of education offered (Omelchenko et al.
2003; Roschina and Drugov, 2003; Shiskin et al., 2005). The impact of the new market oriented
system on access to education and educational opportunities is also controversial.
People's choice: family preferences and inequality of chances
The prestige of education in the Russian society is traditionally high and the share of people
opting for higher levels of education (save for a short period in the early 1990s) has been steadily
growing during the Soviet period and afterwards5. At the same time a sharp increase in tertiary
enrolment has been accompanied by a growing share of secondary school dropouts. According to
Population Census data, between 1989 and 2002 the share of young people (15-24 years)
possessing not more than primary education increased from 5.6% to 7.5%. Another 9.2% of the
age group 20-24 possess only 8 years of education which manifests an almost twofold increase
as compared to 1989. The growing share of functionally illiterate low competitive and low
productive marginal groups of population is the most open and vivid manifestation of rising
inequality of educational opportunities in the contemporary Russian society. But to a large extent
inequality patterns in education are of hidden character and stem from the growing segmentation
of educational system.
At the first glance during the last decade university education has become almost universally
accessible. The overwhelming majority of families (from 60% to 85% according to different
surveys) intend to give children nothing less than university education. And in most cases, once
the child succeeded in completing full secondary education (high school, i.e. ISCED 3), they
manage to realize this intention. According to a survey conducted by IISP (Institute for
Independent Social Policy) in 4 Russian regions in 2001, about 80% of high school leavers
intended to go for university education right after finishing school and only 5% never planned to
go to a university at all. The de facto share of school leavers admitted to universities the same
year amounted to 70%, and of those who participated in entrance exams – 90% (Roschina and
Drugov, 2003).
At the same time the share of students getting free university education financed from the state
budget (budget students) was steadily going down to 87% in 1995/1996 and to 40.9% in
2006/2007. The share of annual student admittance supported by budget financing experienced
even a sharper decline (Table 7). A growing majority is obliged to pay for their education.
Indeed the rapid rise in enrolment was wholly due to ‘commercial’ students (that is paying full
tuition fees for their education). Among different groups of population a belief is growing that
education on commercial basis is the only possible way for an ordinary citizen to get admitted to
a university.
5 A theoretical model explaining high propensity for human capital investment in economies of transition is
presented in Spagat, 2006.
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Table 7
Admittance to University Education (ISCED 5A level)





1995 78.6 13.7 7.7
1998 59.6 31.5 8.9
1999 53.3 36.1 10.6
2000 45.4 42.8 11.8
2001 40.2 46.2 13.6
2002 40.4 46.0 13.6
2003 37.9 48.0 14.1
2004 37.9 45.6 16.6
2005 37.4 46.3 16.3
2006 35.3 47.7 16.9
Source: Data of the Federal Agency for Education
As is  demonstrated  by  sociological  surveys  about  a  half  of  families  with  children  are  ready  to
pay tuition fees and the share is growing. In other words the propensity to invest in human
capital is high. The problem is that the majority of Russian families do not have sufficient
resources (neither financial nor social capital) to make a decent human capital investment in high
quality education of their children. According to Rosstat data, the share of population living
below official poverty level is about 14%. But the respective share for families with children is
almost twice as high – about a quarter of families having at least one child fall below poverty line
and the presence of a second child increases the risk to 35%.
According to a survey of Moscow families with children conducted by our research team in
October 2008 though only about a quarter of respondents (24.8%) stated definitely they could
not  afford  paying  tuition  fees  for  their  children  (with  another  24.1%  stating  ‘hard  to  say’)  the
corresponding share for poor families was 55.5% (with 16.8% stating ‘hard to say’ and only
0.8% stating definitely they would undertake such investment if there were no other way out).
The share of families that could not afford paying tuition increases steadily with the number of
children in the family (Table 8). Thus the gap in educational opportunities between off-springs of
big and small families is getting wider. The children of lone mothers are also at disadvantage.
Table 8
Capacity of Families to Pay Tuition, by Family Category
Family categoryShare of families








Can afford tuition 7.7 13.2 5.0 6.0 4,0 6.9
Can afford if cut
other expenses
38.5 23.3 19.3 15.2 11.9 19.0
Can afford if go
moolighting
20.0 24.8 26.1 13.6 27.7 23.9
Cannot afford 6.2 10.9 29.2 47.0 24.8 24.5
Hard to say 27.7 27.9 20.5 18.2 31.7 25.6
10
Source: Moscow Family Survey
The amount of resources families can spare for investing in education is also vary different.
According to the Moscow family survey the ‘grey’ fees paid unofficially for targeted private
coaching (preparation for entrance university exams) ranged from 1000 rubles per month to
40,000 rubles per month. Another survey reveals an enormous variation in the sum of money the
respondent families were ready to invest in university education of their children: from $100 per
year to $7,000 per year (Roschina and Drugov, 2003). The sad reality is that ‘the market for
educational services’ offers nearly as wide a range of opportunities to obtain a university
diploma. In this situation a large number of families make a forced choice for cheap low quality
education schemes in many cases obtaining the title (university diploma) poorly backed up with
real knowledge and skills. The paradox is that in contemporary Russian context this may still be
a rational enough choice.
Structure of Tertiary Education and Labour Market Demand
In the latest years the demand for university education has been heavily stimulated by heightened
formal requirements of employers. A sort of a triggered off mechanism (accelerator) has been
put in motion. School leavers opt for university education and the majority goes in for it one way
or another. With abundance of fresh made university graduates of all sorts the employers raise
their formal educational requirements. According to surveys 90% of employers demand a
university diploma when hiring any kind of managerial and professional staff and 50% demand it
when hiring clerks and skilled workers. At the same time in many cases they are satisfied with
any university diploma irrespective of specialty looking for ‘cultured, disciplined and quick-
witted’ employee who still needs to be trained and acquire necessary professional skills at the
work  place.  As  one  of  the  employers  put  it  ‘if  he’s  failed  to  get  any  diploma at  all  something
must be wrong with him’.
In this situation it is no wonder that the competitiveness of employees depend strongly on their
formal educational attainment. The National Labour Force Survey data demonstrates that people
with tertiary and especially university education are characterized with higher rates of economic
activity and employment and the lower is risk of unemployment. According to the findings of
Nesterova and Sabirianova people with higher educational attainment are more likely to be hired
by firms with higher average wages. At the same time education impacts their wage in the firm
after being hired to a very small extent (Nesterova and Sabirianova, 1999: 23,24). Thus,
university education is beginning to act not as a human capital accumulation device but as a
‘filter’ or a formal pass to decent work.
At the same time discrepancies between occupational profile of the new labour market entrants
and de facto demand of the employers are gradually increasing, making the problem of human
capital mismatch one of the key barriers to sustainable economic growth. The share of employed
on jobs not matching the specialty acquired in the university increased from 36% for graduates
of 1993-1996 to 42% for those of 1997-2000 and to 56% for those of 2001-2004 (Shishkin,
2005: 13).
As is demonstrated by two rounds of People’s Security Survey conducted by our team in 3
Russian regions only about a half of respondents are inclined to apply and develop the
professional skills they have acquired (or are assumed to have acquired) in the process of formal
learning  and he share have been declining all through the period of economic upturn. It is worth
noting that for young people with recently acquired diplomas the trend is more vivid (Table 9).
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Table 9
Intention to Pursue the Profession Acquired through Formal Tertiary Education in Future Career








All respondents 23.2 34.7 32.5 9.6
Below 29 years 20.3 32.5 36.4 10.8
2007
All respondents 19.1 32.4 33.6 15.0
Below 29 years 14.3 29.7 34.8 21.1
Source: People’s Security Survey
Beginning from 1999 after the severe economic recession was over several types of manpower
deficit are emerging in the Russian labour market:
1) professionals in IT and technical occupations;
2) high quality managerial staff (of ‘European quality standards’);
3) skilled manual workers;
4) low skilled service and auxiliary  workers;
To a different but substantial extent it is the educational system that is responsible for all of these
deficits.
The shortage in technical occupations is logical outcome of reliance on market forces in the
sphere  of  education.  In  the  last  years  the  proportions  between  different  branches  of  university
education have been influenced mainly by demand of families (parents) possessing little
information on the trends of labour market development. As a result during the last decade
(1995-2006) the share of economic and managerial freshmen grew from 18.2% of overall
university admittance to 34.1% and their absolute number increased fivefold. For the most
popular technical occupations – IT, the respective share grew from 1.5% to 2.1% and the
absolute number increased 3.4 times. For the rest of technical occupations the growth was much
less if any. According to expert assessments we have over-saturation of market with economists
and lawyers and a shortage of innovative occupations with best demand prospects. The
overspread desire to be economist, manager or lawyer stems from lack of information available
to school leavers and their families (Bolotov, 2003).
The second deficit is directly linked to low quality standards in the expanding sectors of tertiary
education. Graduates with managerial degree are excessively provided by newly created
universities and academies but the skills they possess do not satisfy employers.
The deficit of skilled workers stems largely from gradual destruction of primary vocational and
(to a lesser extent) lower level tertiary education (see Tables 4 and 10). The factors undermining
the system of vocational education are both of economic and of cultural origin. The destruction
of ‘working class culture’ led to growing unwillingness of young people (usually supported by
parents) to go in for manual occupations. Lowering entrance competition standards made
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academic  requirements  for  admittance  to  universities  relatively  easy  to  meet.  And  reliance  on
consumers demand in shaping the proportions of educational system (disregarding demand of
economy) led to gradual squeezing out of the vocational level disregarding the growing labour
market demand for skilled workers and mid-level technical specialists.
Table 10
Dynamics of number graduates from different levels of professional education (index,
1990=100)
yearEducation level
1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
primary (ISCED 4) 66.1 61.7 60.0 58.6 55.7 53.4
secondary (ISCED 5B) 74.5 86.2 91.1 105.0 110.1 109.9
University (ISCED 5A) 100.4 124.9 158.4 209.5 268.4 312.5
Calculated upon Rosstat data
It is worth noting that with the break of the present economic crisis the artificially booming
labour market for ‘quasi-professionals’ shrank harshly with a rising share of fresh-made
university degree holders becoming unemployed. At the same time the employers are reluctant to
part with skilled workers and technical specialists with experience trying to retain them until the
next upturn at all costs.
Reform reconsidered
The failure of the evolving model of educational system to contribute to equitable access to
human capital irrespective of family background and financial standing, ensure quality standards,
and meet the demands of economy makes it necessary to reconsider the concept of reform.
However the upper-level discussions are carried on not in terms of seeking efficient ways to
develop skills, intellectual and creative faculties and communicative competence of population
vital for sustainable innovative development, but in terms of promptly providing educational
services satisfying solvent demand of individual consumers. The problems of quality control,
reconciling the severe human capital mismatch, modernization of infrastructure and technologies
in education to say nothing of the vital challenge of contributing to equity of opportunity for
children from different families recede into the background.
To my mind whence education is claimed a strategic priority, the state is to play a strong hand in
supporting and shaping the system.  The main directions of the state activities should be as
follows:
1) monitoring the quality control (elaborating unified system of quality standards and closing
down universities (or university departments) that fail to meet them);
2) elaboration of a comprehensive system of easily accessible information on educational
opportunities and labour market trends;
3) adjusting the structure of professional education to the needs of economy;
4) strengthening equality of opportunity in access to education irrespective of the family
background.
Of course in a dynamic world of today it is hardly possible to obtain an accurate long-term
forecast  of  the  employers’  demand for  various  types  of  skills.  And the  fact  itself  imposes  new
challenges on the educational system. It has to contribute to students’ ability and desire for life-
long learning, competence in dealing with abundant but incomplete and rapidly changing
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information, propensity to leave behind obsolete knowledge and skills, and so on. And still any
system of professional education is bound at least to try taking into account the prospective
labour market demand for graduates – otherwise accumulated human capital will be eroded
through misuse. To reduce human capital mismatch active participation of the state in financing
and managing educational system is required.
In addition to the state expenditure alternative sources of financing education should be
considered. Nevertheless the state may withdraw from financial obligations only to the extent
families and socially responsible firms are willing and able to compensate the decline. The
scheme of drawing non-public investment into education should allow the state to maintain
necessary control over the educational system in order to satisfy to the maximum extent equity
requirements  on  the  one  hand  and  the  demands  of  economy  on  the  other.  It  follows  that  any
scheme  chosen  has  to  ensure  that  mere  affluence  (ability  to  pay  tuition)  should  not  act  as
criterion of access to university education.
In the Russian case characterized by very high income differentiation and a large share of
relatively poor families commercialization of education begets a bundle of negative effects.
Firstly, the burden of tuition fees compels families to reduce the basic needs expenditure (food,
leisure, medical care) to unsatisfactory level. Secondly, in the absence of adequate quality
standards it leads to growing segmentation of the quality of education received depending mainly
upon financial (and social) capital of families thus contributing to growing inequality in society
and formation of rigid inequality patterns. Thirdly, the aptitudes and personal characteristics are
to a large extent ignored in admission procedures lowering the outcomes of human capital
accumulation efforts. And lastly the unfairness of the system leads to gradual erosion of societal
values and destroys the motivation of students to study and of professors to do their best in
teaching.
Different schemes of supplying loans to finance university education are being elaborated and
put in practice since 2001. But usually they are of little success. The problem is that they are
organized in the same way as traditional consumer credit schemes and therefore are eligible only
for the relatively affluent part of the population. Such schemes contribute little to equity
purposes. Between 2001 and 2006 only 4500 student loans were granted while the demand is a
lot  greater.  According  to  surveys  right  before  outbreak  of  crisis  about  1/3  of  ‘commercial’
students would like to participate in an educational credit scheme but were not eligible. When
the crisis  broke out an increasing number of students all of a sudden found themselves incapable
of  paying out even modest tuition fees but no emergency safety net was available.
To my mind it is a deferred tuition scheme that is worth considering for Russia6. In the Russian
context such scheme has very strong arguments both pro and contra.
It may be organized as follows. 1. The admittance to universities is gained on the basis of unified
entrance competition irrespective of any financial considerations. 2. The state financing is
allocated among universities and areas of training according to perceived needs of national
economy (priorities). 3. The gap between total costs of education and the costs covered by the
state (state contribution is now on average less than 50% but should be increased) is to be
covered  by  students  or  possibly  by  future  employers.  4.  The  schemes  of  reimbursement  of  the
costs placed upon the student should vary depending only on family income. The most affluent
(e.g. upper deciles income group) have to perform the payment right away. The rest are entitled
to interest-free or low interest loans to be paid after graduation. The fact of entrance exams being
successfully passed should act as a guarantee when supplying these loans. 5. The loan is repaid
6 For a detailed discussion of advantages and barriers for income contingent scheme implementation in transition
economies see Vodopievec, 2004.
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gradually as a fixed share of the former student salary on condition he/she gets it (the salary). So
the period of repayment (and the possible loss to the state budget) depends upon the success of
the graduate in the world of work.
At the same time serious obstacles for successful implementation of such a scheme in Russia do
exist. A critical issue for the viability of income contingent loan schemes is strong administrative
capacity of the state (Vodopievec, 2004). This condition is not met by Russia where one of the
most acute problems is wide spreading informal relations throughout the national economy and
weak enforcement of legal norms. The share of unreported informal earnings and other incomes
is very high. Actual wages may be several times higher than those fixed in the formal contract.
Prevalence of informal norms and practices makes it difficult for the state to collect the amount
of taxes due. According to the data of Tax Inspection, only 17% of economic units regularly pay
all the taxes due, 50% do it in irregular way and 33% do not pay taxes at all (Bekryashev and
Belozyorov, 2000). A survey conducted by Public Opinion Fund reveals that about a third of
respondents consider tax evasion in the Russian context compatible with ethical norms.
Thus  a  task  of  setting  in  force  the  deferred  tuition  scheme is  a  difficult  one.  Still  to  my mind
conceptually this is a promising approach which allows on the one hand meeting economic
demand  for high quality and good matching of national human capital and contributing to
equality of opportunity in getting access to education irrespective of family background and
financial circumstances.
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